International Law Studies - Volume 71
The Law of Armed Conflict:
Into the Next Millennium
Michael N. Schmitt & Leslie C. Green (Editors)

XIII
Nongovernmental Organizations and
International Humanitarian Law

VedNanda

T

he increasing influence of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)
constitutes a significant development in contemporary international
law. This development, however, does not seem to have been a dramatic
departure from the past, for a recent study traces NGO influence on
international governance to the late eighteenth century; it suggests a cyclical
pattern in the participation ofNGOs in international lawmaking-emergence
(1775-1918), engagement (1919-1934), disengagement (1935-1944),
formalization (1945-1949), underachievement (1950-1971), intensification
(1972-1991), and empowerment (1992-1).1
.
It is widely acknowledged that the "intensification" period began with NGO
participation in the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment in Stockholm; continued at the 1974 and 1984 UN World
Population Conferences in Bucharest and Mexico City, the 1974 UN World
Food Conference in Rome, the 1925 and 1985 UN Women's Conferences in
Mexico City and Nairobi, and the 1976 UN Habitat Conference in Vancouver;
and culminated with the UN World Summit for Children in New York in 1990.
The "empowerment" era began with the UN Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which attracted over
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650 NGOs. A special NGO forum was convened, and NGOs were able to
influence governments in the process of negotiations that resulted in the Rio
Declaration, Agenda 21, and the Global Climate and Biodiversity
Conventions. 2
Ever since that time, the expanding role ofNGOs in reaching international
decision makers has become a normal feature of the international landscape.
Thus, it is a valid assertion that in the recent past NGOs have played a growing
role in influencing policy makers. This trend is reflected in the involvement of
NGOs in World Bank decisions on development projects. NGO
representatives have participated both directly and indirectly in multilateral
negotiations on critical issues-human rights, environment, and trade, 3 for
example. On the regional level, NGOs have been engaged in the process of
shaping human rights. 4 The term "civil society" perhaps better captures the
essence of what these organizations are and what they do better than
"nongovernmental organization," which has come under criticism as
inadequately descriptive of their work.5
In the Vienna Declaration Programme of Action, adopted at the Vienna
World Conference on Human Rights in 1993,6 the contribution ofNGOs was
especially acknowledged:
The World Conference on Human Rights recognizes the important role of
non-governmental organizations in the promotion of all human rights and in
humanitarian activities at national, regional and international levels. The World
Conference on Human Rights appreciates their contribution to increasing public
awareness of human rights issues, to the conduct of education, training and
research in this field, and to the promotion and protection of all human rights
and fundamental freedoms. While recognizing that the primary responsibility for
standard-setting lies with States, the Conference also appreciates the
contribution of non-governmental organizations to this process. In this respect,
the World Conference on Human Rights emphasizes the importance of
continued dialogue and cooperation between governments and
non-governmental organizations. 7

Two recent examples of the extent of NGO influence in international
decision making are the World Court Project and the NGO Coalition for an
International Criminal Court. The World Court Project was an international
citizens' initiative to obtain an advisory opinion from the International Court
of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Officially
launched in 1992 by three international nongovernmental organizations, the
initiative was aimed at influencing decision makers at the World Health
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Organization (\VHO) and the United Nations General Assembly to make the
necessary request of the Court, since citizens groups are not allowed by the
rules of the Court to seek such an opinion.8 The Project succeeded; both the
\VHO and the General Assembly made requests. The second example, the
NGO Coalition for an International Criminal Court, has successfully coalesced
the efforts of a number of grassroots organizations and "like,minded"
governments all over the world toward the establishment of an international
criminal court.9
The purpose of this chapter is to study how NGOs, including the
International Committee of the Red Cross (lCRC) , were instrumental in
influencing policy makers on two particular issues-blinding laser weapons and
antipersonnel landmines. Thus the discussion will focus on NGO
contributions toward the development of international humanitarian law on
these topics. It should be noted that the body of international humanitarian
law of armed conflict primarily consists of the series of Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907,10 the four Geneva Conventions of 194911 and their two
Protocols of 1977,12 and the 1980 Conventional \Veapons ConventionY
The role of the ICRC in the formation, application, and monitoring of
international humanitarian law is too well known to need any documentation,
but I will begin with a summary of the Red Cross movement and of the
development of international humanitarian law (with special emphasis on the
role of the ICRC) in order to provide the appropriate historical context for an
appreciation of the role of NGOs in the development of norms related to
blinding laser weapons and landmines.
The JCRC and International Humanitarian Law
The Red Cross movement began in the 1860s as a response to the
publication of Henry Dunant's A Memory of Soiferino, which recounted the
dreadful experience of thousands of wounded soldiers in the aftermath of the
June 1859 battle of Solferino in northern Italy during the wars of Italian
independence. 14 \Vith four citizens of Geneva, Dunant set up the International
Standing Committee for Aid to the Wounded Soldiers, which subsequently
became the International Committee of the Red CrosS. 15 The movement today
consists of several national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, founded by
the ICRC, which cooperate with the ICRC but are independent entities: the
International Conference of the Red Cross; the League of Red Cross Societies;
and the Research and Teaching Center of the International Red Cross, known
as the Henry Dunant Institute.
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The ICRC succeeded in persuading the Swiss government to convene in
1864 an international diplomatic conference, in which twelve States were
represented, that resulted in the signing of the 1864 Geneva Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field.16
Under the treaty, ambulances and military hospitals were "recognized as
neutral, and as such, protected and respected by the belligerents as long as they
accommodate wounded and sickj" hospital and ambulance personnel had "the
benefit of the same neutrality when on duty, and while there remain any
wounded to be brought in and assistedj" "wounded and sick combatants, to
whatever nation they belong, shall be collected and cared forj" and "hospitals,
ambulances and evacuation parties" were distinguished by a uniform flag
bearing "a red cross on a white ground."l?
Subsequently, a treaty concluded in 1899 made applicable the principles of
the 1864 treaty to the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked at seaj the 1864 and
1899 treaties were later revised in 1906 and 1907, respectively.IS In 1920, the
ICRC sent a letter to the League of Nations Assembly urging that asphyxiating
gases be banned. 19 In 1929, after the experience of the First World War, it took
the initiative and convened a diplomatic conference in Geneva at the
invitation of the Swiss Government to adopt a much improved treaty on the
treatment of the wounded and sick on landj it also negotiated a separate
Convention on the Treatment of Prisoners ofWar. 20
The tragedies of the Spanish Civil War and World War II led the ICRC to
initiate moves further to revise and develop the earlier conventions. The Swiss
government called another diplomatic conference in Geneva in 1949, the
result of which was the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, for whose
monitoring and application the ICRC was made responsible.
The ICRC's primary role pertaining to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is to
help wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces and also
prisoners of war. Its delegates visit places of detention, internment, and work
where there are captive personSj delegates approach the detaining power
where appropriate and inspect the living quarters, treatment, and food of the
captivesj and they work toward improving the captives' conditions. In enemy
territory or occupied areas, the ICRC acts on behalf of civilian populations.
Under Article 3, common to all four 1949 Geneva Conventions, it also
functions as a neutral intermediary in non,international armed conflicts. In
such conflicts, the parties are bound to apply enumerated fundamental
principles. The ICRC's Central Tracing Agency searches for missing persons
and exchanges family messages between people separated by armed conflict. In
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addition, the ICRC may be called upon to provide relief such as food, medicine,
and clothing for civilian populations suffering from war.
The ICRC's initial purpose of providing care for sick and injured soldiers in
war has remained intact. The range and scope of the ICRC's functions,
however, have expanded considerably. To illustrate, under the 1949 Geneva
trials of
Conventions the ICRC is given the special task of supervising
prisoners of war in case the protecting power, a neutral State that protects
prisoners of war, cannot exercise these functions. As Article 10 of the
Convention on Prisoners of War provides, if the belligerent powers cannot
agree on a neutral State to serve as the protecting power, "the Detaining Power
shall request or shall accept ... the offer of the services of a humanitarian
organization, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross, to assume
the humanitarian functions performed by Protecting Powers under the present
Convention." 2l
The Geneva Conventions especially mandate that signatory parties
recognize and respect at all times the special position of the ICRC in its
humanitarian activities of providing relief shipments to civilian internees and
inhabitants of occupied territories. 22
The ICRC has been vigilant in ensuring that revisions and further
developments of the existing international humanitarian law instruments take
place when they become necessary. Thus, in 1955 and 1956 it proposed draft
rules for the protection of civilian populations against the effects of war. Its
1956 proposals included a ban on "weapons whose harmful effects, which
resulted in particular from the dissemination of incendiary, chemical,
bacteriological, radioactive or other agents, could spread to an unforeseen
degree or escape ... from the control of those who employ them.... 1123 But
because of the Cold War, the proposed rules did not receive serious
consideration. 24
Subsequently, in 1965, the ICRC undertook to study the possible revisions
to the 1949 Conventions at the 20th International Conference of the Red
Cross, held in Vienna in 1965.25 The Conference adopted a resolution
enumerating the following principles:
• That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited.
• That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations as
such.
• That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in
the hostilities and members of the civilian population, to the effect that the
latter be spared as much as possible.
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• That the general principles of the law of war apply to nuclear and similar
weapons. Z6
It is also important to note that on 19 December 1968 the UN General
Assembly adopted a resolution inviting the Secretary,General to carry out
studies for the revision of earlier conventions on international humanitarian
law "in consultation with the International Committee of the Red Cross."Z7
The resolution was in response to a resolution adopted at the International
Conference on Human Rights in Tehran in April,May 1968 requesting the
General Assembly to invite the Secretary,General to study steps "to secure the
better application of existing humanitarian international conventions and
rules in all armed conflicts" and to inquire into the "need for additional
international humanitarian conventions or for possible revision of existing
Conventions to ensure the better protection for civilians, prisoners of war and
combatants in all armed conflicts and the prohibition and limitation of the use
of certain methods and means of warfare."zs
In 1969, the participants at the 21st International Red Cross Conference at
IstanbuF9 officially requested the organization to undertake the task of revising
and updating the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the ICRC legal staff initiated
the preparatory work. Consultations between governments and Red Cross
Societies under the auspices of the ICRC continued from 1971 to 1974. In
February 1974 the government of Switzerland, which is the depository State of
the 1949 Geneva Conventions, convened a diplomatic conference to discuss
the draft protocols prepared by the ICRC.
The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of
International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts met in yearly
sessions from 1974 to 1977. The United Nations, governments, and the ICRC
participated, and the draft texts prepared by the ICRC formed the basis of
deliberations and negotiations and eventually the final text that emerged. At
the end of the fourth session, on 8 June 1977, delegates of 102 States adopted
Protocol I relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, and Protocol II relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non,International Armed Conflicts.3o
At the Diplomatic Conference, deliberations also began on imposing
possible restrictions or prohibitions on the use of certain conventional
weapons, such as napalm and other incendiary weapons, mines, or booby traps,
but no conclusion was reached on this subject. Thus, the United Nations
convened a special conference to address these issues. The Special Conference
met in two sessions, the first in 1979 and the second in 1980. On 10 October
1980, it adopted the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
342

VedNanda
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively
Injurious Or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (the Weapons Convention), with
three annexed protocols:31 Protocol I, the Non,Detectable Fragments
Protocol; Protocol II, the Mines Protocol; and Protocol III, the Incendiary
Weapons Protocol. These Protocols regulate the use of particular types of
conventional weapons considered to pose special risks of unnecessary suffering
or indiscriminate effects.
The role of the ICRC in disseminating the content of international
humanitarian law is also impressive. Its target groups have been primarily
armed forces and combatants, national Red Cross and Red Crescent personnel,
civil servants in government ministries, the academic community, primary and
secondary school systems, medical professionals, journalists and the media, and
the public.32
Even a summary review of international humanitarian law must include
other important developments in which the ICRC was not a major player. At
the outset, it should be noted that on 24 April 1863, during the Civil War, the
U.S. War Department published General Orders No. 100, Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field. Popularly known as
the Lieber Code (after Francis Lieber, who prepared the historic document), it
established detailed rules on land warfare for the U.S. Army.33 Then the 1868
Declaration of St. Petersburg was adopted as a treaty Renouncing the Use in
Time of War of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight.34
Subsequently, another important development was the Hague Convention
of 1899 with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, with annexed
regulations and a preamble, which included the Martens Clause (named after
its author, the Russian delegate de Martens).35 Under this clause the parties,
recognizing that they had not solved all problems, explained that it was not
their intention "that unforeseen cases should, in the absence of a written
undertaking, be left to the arbitrary judgment of military commanders." Thus,
in such unforeseen cases, both civilians and combatants would "remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of nations, as they result
from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity,
and the dictates of the public conscience."36
In addition, in 1907 the Second Hague Peace Conference addressed
questions of naval warfare and adopted conventions on this subject. Among
other selected significant developments were: a naval conference held in
London two years later, which adopted a Declaration Concerning the Laws of
Naval War;37 the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of
Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of
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Warfare,38 adopted in 1925 under the auspices of the League of Nationsi and
the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the
Event of Armed Conflict,39 adopted under the auspices of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
The Blinding Laser Weapons Protocol
Two NGOs, the ICRC and Human Rights Watch, were instrumental in
mounting a campaign which resulted in the adoption of the Blinding Laser
Weapons Protocol annexed to the Conventional Weapons Convention.40 An
international review convention, begun in 1994, was aimed at particularly
strengthening the Mines Protocol, earlier adopted in 1980.41 However, because
of the work done by these NGOs, it also considered the question of adopting a
new protocol on blinding laser weapons. In May 1996 the international review
process concluded with the adoption of an amended mines protocol and a new
Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons.42 (The Protocol's provisions will be
discussed below, as will the contributions of the ICRC and Human Rights
Watch toward its adoption.)
Article 1 of Protocol IV prohibits the employment of "laser weapons
specifically designed, as their sole combat function or as one of their combat
functions, to cause permanent blindness to unenhanced vision, that is to the
naked eye or to the eye with corrective eyesight devices." Under this article,
the transfer of any such weapon to any State or
entity is prohibited.
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher reported that "[a]lthough the
prospect of mass blinding was an impetus for the adoption of the Protocol, it
was not the intent of the Conference to prohibit only mass blinding.
Accordingly, under both the Blinding Laser Protocol and Department of
Defense policy, laser weapons designed specifically to cause such permanent
blindness may not be used against an individual enemy combatant.,,43
Under Article 2, the parties are obligated to "take all feasible precautions to
avoid the incidence of permanent blindness to unenhanced vision" in the
employment of laser systems other than those described in Article 1. The
article adds that "[s]uch precautions shall include training of their armed
forces and other practical measures." According to Secretary Christopher, this
requirement is "also fully consistent with the policy of the Department of
Defense which is to reduce, through training and doctrine, inadvertent injuries
from the use oflasers designed for other purposes, such as
target
discrimination, and communications."44
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Article 3 provides that "[b]linding as an incidental or collateral effect of the
legitimate military employment of laser systems, including laser systems used
against optical equipment, is not covered by the prohibition of this Protocol."
Commenting on this article, Secretary Christopher said that it "reflects a
recognition of the inevitability of eye injury as the result of lawful battlefield
laser use. It is an important measure in avoiding war crimes allegations where
injury occurs from legitimate laser uses."4s
Article 4 defines permanent blindness as "irreversible and uncorrectible loss
of vision which is seriously disabling with no prospect of recovery. Serious
disability is equivalent to visual acuity ofless than 20/200 Snellen measured in
both eyes." According to the Secretary of State, this definition is "of sufficient
precision to prevent misuse or misunderstanding of the term [permanent
blindness] which is a critical element of Article 1. It is also consistent with
widely accepted ophthalmological standards."46
Under the procedures contained in the Weapons Convention, this Protocol
will enter into force six months after twenty States have notified their consent
to be bound. The scope of the Protocol is limited to the scope of the
Convention, which extends it to international armed conflicts and to internal
conflicts for "national liberation."
The ICRC had addressed the issue of antipersonnel laser weapons at an
experts meeting in 1973; many specialists considered the cost of the use of such
devices to outweigh their benefits and thus were of the opinion that their use
would be unlikely.47
Subsequently, at Government Experts Conferences convened by the ICRC
in Lucerne (September,October 1974)48 and Lagano Oanuary,February
1976),49 the discussion on antipersonnel laser weapons occurred in the context
of deliberations on the developments of future weapons and possible
restrictions on specific weapons.so Several participating experts stated their
assessment that the development of such weapons was "unlikely in the near
future."s1 However, the ICRC again addressed the subject at four experts
meetings that it convened specifically on battlefield laser weapons between
1989 and 1991.52 Sweden and Switzerland, among other nations, had raised
the issue at the 25th International Conference of the Red Cross and were keen
to undertake efforts to ban blinding laser weapons.
In the Prologue to the reports of the experts meetings, ICRC President
Cornelio Sommaruga said that the ICRC was concerned with the effects of
these weapons because of its goal to alleviate the suffering caused by armed
conflicts, and that the attempt was to "supervise developments so that States
may take suitable preventive action."s3 In his words; "Given today's rapid
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technological developments, the widespread proliferation of weapons and the
continued eruption of numerous armed conflicts, it is clear that weapons
developments need to be supervised in order to try to prevent the conflicts of
tomorrow wreaking even more suffering than those of today."s4
Participants at these meetings included, in addition to experts on
international humanitarian law, specialists in laser technology, psychiatry,
ophthalmology, and military medicine. After deliberations on a wide range
of aspects of the possible military use of laser technology and its physical,
psychological, and medical ramifications, the discussions centered on legal
and policy implications of the use of such weapons and whether the causing
of permanent blindness was in violation ofinternational humanitarian law.
The ICRC concluded that blinding was more severe and debilitating than
most other war injuries. Battlefield stress and post,traumatic stress
syndrome were both determined to occur more frequently in persons
blinded in battle.55
At the conclusion of the April 1991 meeting, several regulatory measures
aimed at prohibiting the use of blinding laser weapons were identified.56
Subsequently the ICRC stated that blinding as a method of warfare "is a
superfluous injury and a cause of unnecessary suffering, both of which are
prohibited under existing international humanitarian law."57 It vigorously
advocated the banning of blinding laser weapons.
Human Rights Watch was also active in undertaking studies and generating
public support to ban blinding laser weapons. In May 1995 it published a report
on U.S. blinding,laser weapons.58 After an overview of tactical laser weapons
and of the status of U.S. and foreign tactical laser weapons programs, Human
Rights Watch recommended that "parties to the 1980 Conventional Weapons
Convention should adopt a new protocol at the September 1995 Review
Conference which would prohibit blinding as a method of warfare and ban
blinding tactical laser weapons."S9
In September 1995, Human Rights Watch published another study, Blinding
Laser Weapons-The Need to Ban a Cruel and Inhumane Weapon. 60 It analyzed
the development of tactical laser weapons programs in the United States and
China,61 especially noting the Chinese ZM,87 portable Laser Disturber,
weighing seventy,three pounds and capable of transmitting a beam at several
wavelengths.62 The Chinese effort to market the ZM,87,63 designed specifically
to injure eyesight, was a matter of serious concern and could not have gone
unnoticed by participants at the Review Conference of the 1980 Conventional
Weapons Convention.
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The study also discussed legal and humanitarian considerations, specifically
the prohibition against unnecessary suffering and superfluous .injury and the
need to balance military necessity against humanitarian considerations,
suggesting that
[pJublic opinion might be more negatively affected by large numbers of blind
than large numbers of dead, because the blind "would remain in view and be
distressful for society." Furthermore, the use of weapons designed to produce
extreme handicaps or excessive damage have always produced unnecessary
strain on peace negotiations, later peaceful relations between nations no longer
at war, and societal infrastructure. Consequences to society are an important'
political factor in deciding whether to ban a particular weapon. 64

The Human Rights Watch study analyzed the language of the Draft Protocol,
which was originally proposed by Sweden, and recommended strengthening
it.6S It also urged that blinding as a method of warfare be prohibited. 66
A detailed discussion of the application of international humanitarian law
to blinding laser weapons-what constitutes "unnecessary suffering" and
"superfluous injury," the concept of proportionality, "military necessity," and
the Martens Clause is beyond the scope of this paper.67 Similarly, how to
construe Protocol W, an admittedly important issue, will n<;>t be discussed
here. 6s Nor will I review the pros and cons of the assertion that blinding as a
method of warfare should have'been prohibited, as suggested by the ICRC and
Human Rights Watch. The Protocol only prohibits the employment of "laser
weapons specifically designed, their sole combat function or as one of their
combat functions, to cause permanent blindness."
The pertinent point to be, stressed here is that these" human rights
organizations had a powerful impact upon parties to the Review Conference
and were able to persuade them that in the application of international
humanitarian law the social costs involved in weapons designed to cause
blindness should be especially taken into account, and that blinding laser
weapons should be banned.
As noted earlier, the United States was eventually convinced of the need to
ban blinding laser weapons. Thus, in transmitting the
on Blinding
Laser \Veapons to the Senate for advice and consent, President William J.
Clinton said on 7 January 1997 that "[t]hese blinding lasers are not needed by
our military forces. They are potential weapons for the future, and the United
States is committed to preventing their emergence and use. The United States
supports the adoption of this new Protocol.,,69

as
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The Convention on Antipersonnel Landmines
A treaty banning antipersonnel landmines, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti,Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction,70 was signed in Ottawa, Canada, on December
3,4, 1997.71 The Convention was adopted in Oslo in September 1997 and will
come into force six months after forty States have ratified it.72 The UN
Secretary,General is designated as the Convention's depository.13 The
International Campaign to Ban Landmines, comprising several NGOs, including
the ICRC, Human Rights Watch, Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation,
and Physicians for Human Rights, was instrumental in mounting a successful
campaign which culminated in the adoption of the Convention.74
This section will first note the pertinent provisions of the Landmines
Convention and will then look briefly at the two earlier efforts, Protocol II of
the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention and its amended version
adopted by the Review Conference of that Convention in 1996. The
concluding part will discuss the role ofNGOs.

The Provisions of the Landmines Convention. As the title of the Landmines
Convention suggests, the treaty prohibits the use, stockpiling, production, and
transfer of antipersonnel mines and mandates their destruction. In its
preamble, States parties stressed "the role of public conscience in furthering
the principles of humanity as evidenced by the call for a total ban of
anti,personnel mines and recogniz[ed] the efforts to that end undertaken by
the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines and numerous other non,governmental
organizations around the world." They also
[based] themselves on the principle of international humanitarian law that the
right of the parties to an armed conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is
not unlimited, on the principle that prohibits the employment in armed conflicts
of weapons, projectiles and materials and methods of warfare of a nature to cause
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering and on the principle that a distinction
must be made between civilians and combatants.
Under the Convention, States parties undertake never under any circumstances:
a) To use anti,personnellandminesj
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b) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to
anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;
c) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any
activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.75

Parties undertake within four years "to destroy or ensure the destruction of
all stockpiled anti-personnel mines" that they own or possess, or that are under
their jurisdiction or controU6 Moreover, they undertake to destroy all
antipersonnel mines in mined areas under their jurisdiction or control within
ten yearsj77 to make every effort to identify, mark, and ensure the safety of
landmine areaSj 7S and to seek extension of the deadline for completing the
destruction of antipersonnel mines for a period up to ten years. 79 The decision
on extension is to be made according to set criteria and procedures.so
Consistent with earlier definitions of landmines in Protocol II and revised
Protocol II, an antipersonnel mine is defined as one "designed to be exploded
by the presence, proximity, or contact of a person and that will incapacitate,
injure, or kill one or more persons."S!
The Convention contains detailed proviSions on international cooperation
and assistance. To illustrate, States parties undertake
to facilitate and ... participate in the fullest possible exchange of equipment,
material, and scientific and technological information concerning the
implementation of this Convention. The States Parties shall not impose undue
restrictions on the provision of mine clearance equipment and related
technological information for humanitarian purposes.82

They are also to provide assistance for mine victims and a mine-awareness
program,S3 as well as mine clearance and related activities through the UN
system, international or regional organizations, NGOs, or bilaterally, or by
contributing to the UN Voluntary Trust Fund for assistance in mine clearance
or other regional funds set up for demining.84 In addition, they are to provide
assistance for the destruction of stockpiled antipersonnel mines. 8S
Within six months of the Convention's entry into force, States parties are to
report to the UN Secretary-General their national legal, administrative, and
other measures, including penal sanctions, taken to implement the
Convention within their jurisdiction or controlj86 the total number of all
stocked antipersonnel mines and the status of programs for their destructionj
and the types and quantities of the mines destroyed since the entry into force of
the Convention.S7 Such information is to be annually updated and reported.s8
Among other pertinent provisions, the Secretary-General is to convene the
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first meeting of the States parties within one year after the Convention's entry
into force,89 to be followed by annual meetings until the first Review
Conference, five years after the entry into force of the Convention.90 NOOs
may be invited as observers.9l
The Convention outlines amendment procedures, requiring a majority of
the
of the States parties present and voting. 92 It provides for NOO
attendance at amendment conferences as well, 93 for consultation and
cooperation among States parties, and the use of the good offices of the
meeting of the States parties as the means for settlement of disputes. The
Convention also sets forth detailed provisions on facilitation and clarification
notice
of compliance,94 prohibits reservations,95 and requires a
period for a State's withdrawal.96
Though it is a
document compared with the earlier
attempts(as will be discussed below), one weakness of the Convention is that
the enforcement provisions are not very effective. Similarly, its applicability to
actors should perhaps have been strengthened. However, to allow
negotiations on the prohibitions of specific weapons to succeed, some
compromises had to be made.

of the Convention on Conventional Weapons. As mentioned
earlier, Protocol II of the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention was an
attempt to regulate antipersonnellandmines in aid of the Convention's major
purpose of prohibiting the deployment and use of weapons which cause
unnecessary suffering, especially to noncombatant civilians. 97 It did not
succeed in prohibiting landmines, and the regulations it established were weak,
lacking provisions for implementation and enforcement. 98
The definition oflandmines under the Protocol was similar to the one now
contained in the 1997 Landmines Convention-"any munition placed under,
on or near the ground ... and designed to be detonated ... by the presence,
proximity, or contact of a person."99 Also prohibited was the use of mines or
booby traps "in all circumstances ... in offense, defense or by way of reprisals,
against the civilian population ... or against individual civilians."loo
The indiscriminate use of conventional weapons that are not directed against
a military objective, or which use delivery methods that cannot be directed at
specific military targets, or that when employed "may be expected to cause
incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated" were outlawed.10l Additionally, use of

Protocol II
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such weapons in areas of civilian concentration was prohibited when combat
has ceased in those areas or does not appear imminent. l02
A major deficiency in the Protocol was that combatants were not to be liable
if they issued appropriate warnings or cordoned the areas of deployment from
civilian access. l03 Furthermore, the purpose of protecting civilians was never
accomplished, although the Protocol did contain some safeguards, such as
requiring the recording and publication of locations of antipersonnel mine
deployment and the taking of precautions to protect civilians from the "effects
of minefields, mines, and booby traps,,,l04 providing for international
cooperation in the removal of such weapons, 105 and recording the location of
the buried conventional weapons.
Thus, at the request of States parties to the Conventional Weapons
Convention, the United Nations convened a conference to review the
provisions of the Convention, especially its Protocol II, the Landmine Protocol,
which met in the fall of 1995 and resumed sessions in January and April,May
1996.106 It should be noted that the General Assembly invited interested
NGOs, especially the ICRC, to attend the Conference. l07
Although the amended Protocol II did not ban antipersonnel landmines,
the prior Protocol was strengthened through an agreement among the
participants to impose stricter restrictions on the use, export, and production of
these weapons. lOS The scope of its application was expanded to include internal
conflicts, albeit with some limitations. 109 Among general restrictions,
provisions concerning effective advance warnings and parties' responsibilities
were added. 11 °Thus, each party to a conflict is responsible for landmines placed
by it and for their clearance, removal, destruction, or maintenance under the
terms contained in the amended Protocol. l11 The terms are contained in
Article 10. The use of certain mines, such as self,deactivating mines, equipped
with an anti,handling device designed to make the mine capable of exploding
after the mine ceases to function, is also prohibited,112 as are mines with
mechanisms specifically designed to detonate in the presence of commonly
available mine detectorsll3 and also nondetectible mines, unless their use is in
compliance with the Technical Annex (2).114
The amended Protocol contained restrictions on the use of antipersonnel
mines other than remotely delivered mines,115 on the use of remotely delivered
mines,116 and on the transfer of mines.ll7 It also contained provisions on
recording and publication requirements for landmines, expanding the earlier
requirements under the 1980 Protocol II.11s States parties are now required to
clear, remove, destroy, or maintain all minefields, mined areas, and mines. 119
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Among other provisions included in the amended Protocol II are those on
technical cooperation and assistance,120 and those for protection of all forces or
missions from the effects of mines in any area under the parties' control. 121 States
parties have also agreed on compliance procedures and consultation measures. 122
Although the amended Protocol II strengthened the provisions of the 1980
Protocol II by regulating, in addition to previous limits on their use, mine
transfers, and production, there was concern over the effectiveness of these
regulations. The requirements that mines be manufactured with
and
devices reduce the risk of accidental
detonation by a failure in the
process, but the exceptions to the
requirements still present risks.
Furthermore, the major defect in the 1980 Protocol II, relating to the
indiscriminate effect of landmines, remained unresolved in that amended
Protocol II allowed the use or transfer of existing mines other than
nondetectible mines (which did not have to be removed for another nine years
if a party could not immediately comply with the requirement to include a
detectable mechanism in mines produced before January 1, 1997).123
Enforcement mechanisms also remain deficient. For these reasons, the effort
was begun to draft a convention to prohibit landmines.

The NGO Contribution. Perhaps on no other issue of public concern have
NGOs achieved so spectacular a success as on the issue of banning landmines.
Several studies by NGOs, especially Landmines: A Deadly Legacy, 124
Landmines-Friend or Foe?l25 and several reports on the impact
oflandmines in specific countries (such as Angola, 126 Cambodia, 127 El Salvador,
and Nicaragua 12S and Iraq), 129 were instrumental in educating the public about
the nature and gravity of the problem caused by landmines. Thus, this work set
the stage for the Review Conference and-because of the NGOs'
persistence-led to the eventual prohibition of antipersonnel landmines by
adoption of the Landmines Convention in December 1997.
The International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which began operating in
1991 and comprised 250 groups, coordinated NGO activities. 130 In 1992, the
Campaign issued a joint call for an international ban,131 and by 1993 it had
been joined by representative NGOs from several countries. Ultimately, the
campaign "succeeded over fourteen months in persuading countries to join a
major international treaty, a process that usually takes years." m
Canada provided leadership in what became known as the Ottawa Process.
In October 1996 the Canadian government gathered representatives from
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countries and asked them to return to Ottawa in December
1997 to sign an agreement to ban antipersonnel mines by the year 2000.133
The Conference held a "Mine Action Forum" and produced an Agenda for
Mine Action, and the United Nations Development Programme announced
that it envisages setting up "mine action centers" in poor countries where
development is impeded because of scattered mines. 134 At the signing
conference, government representatives and NGO experts discussed its next
step, the Ottawa Process II, an initiative to obtain international commitment
to furthering mine clearance, victim assistance, and rehabilitation. 135
The demining process is extremely expensive, costing up to a thousand dollars
per mine for removal, compared to the procedure for laying the mines in the first
place. To address this financial obstacle, the United States announced it will
host an international demining donor conference in May 1998; nearly $400
million has already been donated by Norway, Japan, Canada, and the European
Commission, among others, to aid in the work over the next five years. 136
Conclusion
Nongovernmental organizations have played a significant role in the efforts
to ban blinding laser weapons and antipersonnellandmines. In educating the
public on the crisis caused by these inhumane weapons and in influencing
decision makers in many countries to agree upon conventions to prohibit these
weapons, NGOs were and continue to be instrumental in ensuring that
established legal tradition in which the use, production, stockpiling, and export
of unjustifiably inhumane weapons is prohibited applies explicitly to these two
weapons as well.
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